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THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT EXEMPTION: STATE LAW DEVICES FOR
RESTRICTING TRANSFER IN THE CONTEXT OF
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Adoption of Rule 144 and other recent expressions' of Securities and
Exchange Commission2 policy on the "private placement" exemptions from
registration under the Securities Act of 19333 again emphasize the im-
portance of restrictions on transfer of securities through the specific means
of legended certificates, "stop-transfer" orders and letters of investment
intent. These three restricting devices in turn are given effect not through
the body of federal securities law but rather through states' law, primarily
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code." It appears to have been con-
cluded generally that the three restricting devices provide either nearly
complete or the only available insurance against issuer liability arising from
secondary distribution of unregistered securities. The conclusion in either
alternative is not invalid per se but the underlying analyses are worthy of
more careful attention than has been given them in the literature to date.
Moreover, some evidence suggests that in practice the use of the three re-
stricting devices is not always complete and automatic. The Commission's
current position and the courts' extentions of liability under the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 19341
dictate the conclusion that omission from the private placement game plan
of the three devices may have increasingly serious consequences.
This discussion will examine the legal effect of the three transfer re-
stricting devices under federal securities law and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and will give special attention to potential liabilities of the is-
suer, the transfer agent and their attorneys. Of necessity, the discussion
will probe and highlight the interrelation and lack thereof between the
two bodies of federal and states' laws. In the broadest terms, the three
restricting devices are used to avoid registration under the Securities Act;
the aim is accomplished by making secondary distributions both undesir-
able and difficult if not impossible. Because Article 8 of the Code is
intended to confer negotiability on investment securities, transfer restric-
tions run counter to its most basic purpose, and indeed conflict with a
more pervasive history of legal thought eschewing limitations on aliena-
tion of property. These conflicts between the objectives of unlimited
1 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) (Rule 144). Also material to this
discussion is Proposed Rule 146, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972), and to
a lesser extent Proposed Rule 147, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5349 (Jan. 8, 1973).
2 Hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
3 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act.]
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 Official Text) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
r Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ex.
change Act].
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transferability of securities and protection of the investing public on one
hand and between two bodies of law separately drafted for different pur-
poses on the other provide the context within which the issuer planning a
private placement must chart its course. Because the three transfer
restricting devices are used primarily to avoid liabilities under federal law,
it is appropriate to consider first the issuer's problem in the context of
the Securities Act.
II. THE ISSUER'S DILEMMA:
THE RISK OF A PUBLIC OFFERING
A. The Commercial Context and the Risk of a Public Offering
One commentator has observed that over one third of all corporate
financing in the United States since 1945 has been privately placed.'
While most of the investors have been institutions,7 the relatively unso-
phisticated private investor still plays a substantial role in corporate fi-
nancing.8  Although the difficulties of statutory interpretation raised in
this discussion are found in many contexts,9 they are particularly trouble-
some to the new and small but growing company. 10 As expansion
opportunities raise the need for additional venture capital, management
may not be enthusiastic about the problems attendant to "going public,"
or even of the reports required under the provisions of Regulation A."1
After exploring the possibilities of private placement with institutional
investors, management may be unwilling to meet the terms demanded by
those investors12 and feel that it can sell its securities to private investors
at a more favorable percentage of market value. Accordingly, manage-
ment may carefully select 15 to 20 offerees,13 whom it will make pretense
6 W. CARY, CORpoRATIONs 1339 (4th ed. unabr. 1969) (ciing SEC Statistical Bull., Apr.
1968).
7 Approximately 90 percent have been insurance companies. Id.
8 At least one indication of the continued vitality of the private placement exemption is pro-
vided by recent promulgation of SEC Rule 144 and the continued reluctance of the Commission
to take the ultimate step of flatly requiring use of the three transfer restriction devices for Se-
curities Act § 4(2) qualification. See section III, infra.
9 For example, the problems of disposal of privately placed securities are raised by both the
risk of public offering discussed herein and the "control" concept under the Security Act defini-
tion of an underwriter. See Securities Act § 2(11), SEC Rule 144; A. Sommer, Who's in Con-
trol?", 21 Bus. LAW. 559 (1966), in SELEcrED ARTcLFS oN FEDERAL SE MRIES LAW 195
(ABA 1968).
10 And even more so if the company has so few shareholders that there is no established over
the counter market for its shares, and assuming no reporting requirement under § 12(g) of the
Exchange Act.
"Under Securities Act § 3(b). Moreover, management may intend to exceed the $500,000
limitation.
12 Management may well be concerned in this situation about retaining control inconsistent
with the terms demanded by both some institutional and very sophisticated private investors or
about agreeing, for example, to maintain a given level of working capital.
13 Four of whom reside in another state. This hypothetical avoidance of the intrastate exemp-
tion, Securities Act § 3(a)(11), should not be taken to minimize the necessity for a thorough
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of indoctrinating with all the information registration would provide
(even assuming availability of such information). The risk of public of-
fering can arise in several ways. For example, management may learn
either before or after transfer that several of its offerees intend to transfer
shares to others immediately after receipt, 14 or are acting as nominees for
investor groups; after the distribution, management may learn that some
of the shares have been pledged to creditors.
Because the Commission lacks the means to police all private place-
ments and perhaps because of general tacit acceptance of a "number of
offerees" test, so long as all goes well and the investment attractiveness
of the shares increases, the risk of unregistered public offering effects is
reduced substantially. When, however, circumstances unique to the issuer
or to its industry lead its shareholders to unsuccessful attempts to dispose
of their privately placed securities, complaints of unauthorized distri-
bution are more than a remote possibility.15 As this discussion will demon-
strate, the effects of these complaints will differ materially if the issuer
has employed legended certificates, letters of investment intent and the
stop-transfer order or if the issuer has ignored these devices for restrict-
ing transferability of the shares distributed. The latter practice may be
commonplace in those market localities where investors are characteristi-
cally reluctant to accept legended certificates.
The foregoing observation raises a material practical consideration:
While the issuer's counsel may be concerned primarily with avoiding a
public offering and the consequences thereof, management's first concern
is raising capital. This means, first, that restrictions on the transferabil-
ity of the privately distributed shares should go only as far as is neces-
sary to provide protection under the Securities and Exchange Acts; further
restrictions will necessarily decrease the investment attractiveness of the
securities. Second, management's interest in a lucrative distribution in-
vites counsel to ignore risks attendant to private placement. Prior to
examination of the increase in potential liability occasioned by omis-
sion from a private placement of the three restricting devices, a brief exam-
ination of the private distribution in the context of the Securities Act
is appropriate.
Section 5(a) of the Securities Act makes unlawful the sale of a secu-
examination of local law in any unregistered offering. With respect to exceptions to state
Blue Sky regulation, see, e.g., OHIo Rsv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.02, .03, .06 (Page Supp. 1970),
and note 38 supra.
14 A possibility some results of which are discussed in an unpublished memorandum by
Professor J. Slain of the Ohio State University College of Law.
15 Because the risk of public offering effects increases as the cttractiveness of the shares de-
creases, the ill-advised issuer may be faced with liabilities under federal securities law at a time
when it is beset by other substantial difficulties. So long as the "market" value of the shares In-
creases, the practical risk of public offering is reduced substantially.
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rity16 as to which a registration statement is not in effect, and § 5 (c) ex-
tends the prohibition to offers.17 Section 4(2) exempts from § 5 "trans-
actions by an issuer not involving any public offering." Construing
the intent of the Securities Act to protect the investing public through
full disclosure, the Commission 8 and the courts 9 have determined that
the existence of a private offering is a question of fact, turning primarily
on whether the offerees have access to substantially the same informa-
tion which registration would provide-a "sophistication and access of
the offerees" test.20
Even assuming, however, that the issuer's immediate offerees have ac-
cess to the requisite information, the private placement exemption can
be lost if these offerees transfer securities to the uninformed. This is the
problem of secondary distribution, which may make the distributing of-
feree an "underwriter," one who purchased from the issuer with a view to
distribution2' and is a "conduit for a wider distribution."2 2  Thus, a sub-
stantial portion of the issuer's risk of public offering will depend upon
the "investment intent" of its offerees as that intent is reflected in their
subsequent actions.3
It follows, from the point of view of avoiding registration, that a com-
plete restriction on transfer would preclude issuer liability. If the original
offerees were legally unable to transfer title to their shares absent compli-
ance with the Securities Act, the risk of a public offering would be fore-
closed. On the other hand, shares so restricted would be of limited in-
vestment attractiveness. This observation raises another serious practical
problem in planning the private distribution. The offeree who takes with
a view to further distribution (which may relate only to the time of
holding) will have substantial difficulty in disposing of his securities.24
16 Making use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
17 "Sale" and "offer" are defined in Securities Act § 2(3).
18See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30. 1970); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
19 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
2 0 See WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 16-17 (C. Israels & G. Duff, eds., PLI 1962); S.
Owen, The Private Offering and Intrastate Exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933, ABA
L NOTES (Jul. 1967), rev. in SELECrED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 165 (ABA
1968).
2 1 Securities Act § 2(11).
2 2 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
23 G. Wood, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L REV.
1043 (1964), in SELECTED ARTICES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw 145 (ABA 1968).
2 4 As an underwriter under § 2(11), and as subject to SEC Rule 144. The burden of estab-
lishing an exemption-in this instance § 4(1) (transactions by any person other thn an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer)-is on the person seeking it, Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1960), and good faith of the secondary transferee
may be a factor in determining its status as an underwriter, SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d
485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960); J. Sargent, The Guild Films Case: The Effect
of "Good Faith" in Foreclosure Sales of Unregistered Securities Pledged at Collateral, 46 VA.
L REV. 1573 (1960), in SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 245 (ABA 1968).
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This dampening effect on the value of privately placed shares, is if any-
thing increased by the application of the recently adopted Commission
Rule 144.25
B. The "Clarity" Provided by Rule 144
In an apparent search for a rule subject to application on objective
criteria, the draftsmen of Rule 144 followed the percent formula approach
of Rule 154. While this approach, read with other recent Commission
releases,20 may alleviate some of the § 2(11) problems at the time of
original issue, Rule 144 so limits the ability of the offerees to unload that
the investment attractiveness of privately placed securities is reduced in
relation to prior law. For example, under Rule 144 can offerees demand
an agreement providing the order and amount in which each will be
permitted to leak his shares after a given period ?2 If such an agreement
is reached does the more objective approach of the Rule disregard "in-
vestment intent" or is the fact of the agreement itself evidence of under-
writer status? Can each of the offerees leak up to the permitted one
percent 28 or would such an agreement aggregate the securities held by
all ?29 Moreover, if the issuer consented to such a "leak agreement,"
would it be deemed to be aware that its offerees intended to sell in a par-
ticular period and thus be engaged in a public offering ?"
Although the Commission stated initially that it would not issue no-
action letters with respect to Rule 144,8' the contents of the substantial
number of such letters to date provide some insight into its reading of
the Rule. While the Commission will not regard "sales within successive
25Notice of adoption: SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg.
596 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Rule 144). This is not to suggest that an offeree must vio-
late Rule 144 in order to cause his issuer to lose the § 4(2) exemption. See note 39 and the dis'
cussion accompanying notes 61 to 67 infra.
26 See section III, infra.
27 In this context with respect to Rule 144 itself. Such an agreement might be desirable also
because of the disruptive effects of substantial sales on a small market, effects which, according to
the Commission, the Rule seeks to avoid. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Apr. 13, 1972,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 78,769.
28Rule 144(e).
29 Rule 144(e)(1), (3), 144(a)(1). "Resale of restricted securities by all persons agreeing to
act in concert to effect a distribution of such securities would be aggregated." SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5186 (Sept. 10, 1971).80 Such an arrangement might also present problems under Rule lOb.6, 17 C.F.R. 240.lob.6
(1971).
31 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). The way taken by Mr. N. 0,
Gaines may still be the only way. W. Kennedy, The Case of the Scarlet Letter or the Easy Way
Out on "Private Offerings", 23 Bus. LAW. 23 (1967), in SELEcrI1D ARTICLES ON FE3DERAL Sn3.
CURITIES LAW 115 (ABA 1968). For example, a college student with a wife and two children
who had been paid in securities by his former employer, the issuer's president, was recently
referred to the "simplicity" of Rule 144 by the Commission. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of
Jul. 6, 1972, CCH FED. L. REP. 5 78,892. This "simplicity" has already resulted in an Inter-
pretive release in addition to the numerous letters. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306 (Sept.
26, 1972).
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six month periods without more'2 2 or the "mere" fact that officers and di-
rectors of the issuer propose to sell securities 33 to require aggregation of
such securities for determination of the number which may be sold, where
20 holders of restricted stock agree to a specific limiting schedule of indi-
vidual sales, those holders are agreeing to act in concert for the purpose of
selling securities and their sales will be aggregated under the Commis-
sion's reading of the Rule.-5 Further, the noncontrolling shareholder
who makes use of Rule 144 is bound by it as to future sales of restricted
securities of the same issuer,36 and pending an accurate measure of over-
the-counter sales, even negligible trading on a national exchange will
be used to compute the saleable amount.37
Thus, the small company which desires to conduct a private placement
and to avoid a small number of institutional investors may be forced to
distribute under a covenant either to register a subsequent issue and
exchange the legended shares for clean ones or to become a reporting
company. 8  But even in the face of Rule 144's rigidity, the public offer-
ing concept still exists, and with it the issuer's concern for restricting the
ability of the original offerees to foreclose the private placement exemp-
tion. 9 In the context of restrictions on transferability, there is some
32 SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Jun. 13, 1972, CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 78,945.
3 3 SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of May 1, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 78,824.
3 4 Under Rule 144(e)(3)(F).
35 SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Apr. 13, 1972, CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 78,763. Simi.
larly, meetings of shareholders for the purpose of arranging "an orderly method" of sale trigger
both the aggregation provision and Rule 254(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a)(2) (1971). SEC,
Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Apr. 12, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 78,774. Where the agree-
meat is restrictive only and is made pursuant to participation in a public offering, however, the
aggregation provision may be inapplicable. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Apr. 13, 1972,
CCH FED. SEc L REP. 5 78,769.
'6 SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Jul. 6, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 78,894.
3 7 In lieu of one percent of the class outstanding under Rule 144(e). SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin.
Letters of Jun. 9, Jun. 22, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 78,859, 78,866, 78,867.
38 The dilemma confronting the issuer who plans a distribution under the intrastate exemp-
tion, Securities Act § 3(a)(11), is similar in at least two vital respects: First, actions of the offerees
may disqualify the issuer's use of the exemption. Second, the problem of disqualification usu-
ally arises in the face of other substantial issuer difficulties. The intrastate exemption and a
recommended approach are examined in Comment, The Intrastate Exemption: Current Law,
Local Practice and the Wheat Report, 31 OHIo ST. LJ. 521 (1970) . This intrastate problem is
not solved by Proposed Rule 147, because that rule contains an absolute placement test. Rule
147 (f). The intrastate issuer is still not interested in precluding certain placements of its secur-
ities.
39 To some extent, the effects of Rule 144 on the investment attractiveness of restricted se-
curities will serve in part to accomplish this result, with as yet unknown consequences in the
marketplace. For example, the Commission has stated that the Rule is not available to persons
who have purchased under a stock option plan registered under Form S-8. SEC, Div. of Corp.
Fin. Letter of May 10, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 78,847. Perhaps more important, the
application of the Rule to foreclosing lending institutions is certain to affect indirectly the invest-
ment attractiveness of privately placed shares. The Commission has taken the positions that,
while a lending institution may use Rule 144 in disposing of collateral if its debtor was no more
than the holder of shares, SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of May 5, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L REP.
5 78,828, shares of a pledgor and a pledgee acquired in private transactions are subject to the
aggregation provision, SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Mar. 28, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L REP.
5 78,761, and that a foreclosing bank is a "person for whose account securities are to be sold"
and thus must comply with the Rule. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Jul. 31, 1972, CCH
'n r T P1P q 7R d44 Fwr the numrnoses of comnutina the amount of securities which may
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evidence that the Commission may be moving away from the position
that offeree action alone can lose the private placement exemption.
III. TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT
A. A Change of Position?
The Commission releases announcing proposal and adoption of Rule
14440 contain a strong statement on the use of legends and stop-transfer
instructions: "the use of such devices is strongly suggested by the Com-
mission and will be considered a factor in determining whether in fact
there has been a private placement." Accompanied by formal (if be-
lated) recognition that the change of circumstances doctrine is unre-
lated to the disclosure at which the Securities Act is aimed,41 the state-
ment may reflect a Commission willingness to acknowledge that the char-
acter of a distribution, for purposes of applying the private placement
exemption to the issuer, should give emphasis to issuer conduct. The
question is the application of the Commissioner's statement beyond the
confines of Rule 144.
In 1935 the Commission announced that determinations of public or
private distribution would be made on the basis of the number of of-
ferees, the number of units offered, the size of the offering and the man-
ner of the offering.42 By 1962 the Commission had departed somewhat
from these relatively objective criteria and had emphasized that the exist-
ence of a private offering was a question of fact,43 not to be found sole-
ly with reference to such "self-serving" statements as letters of invest-
ment intent.44 In the context of secondary distributions, this position put
be sold under Rule 14 4(e)(3)(6), however, the Commission appears to have extended the scope
of § 4(2):
[A] person need not include securities sold in private transactions which arc eflected
in a manner similar to private placements by issuers under § 4(2) of the Securities
Act.
SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Aug. 9, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L REP, 5 79,006 (emphasis
added). The import of this letter may well be the subject of some debate.
40 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972); SEC Securities Act Release No.
5186 (Sept. 10, 1971).
41Id.
42 SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935). There have been several efforts to
secure adoption of "number of offerees" tests, at least in limited circumstances. For example,
Proposed Rule 181 nonexclusively exempts an issue to less than 25 offerees as not a public of-
fering when it is solely in connection with acquisition by the issuer of "a bona fide going busi-
ness." Proposed SEC Rule 181, WiEAT REPORT, Appendix VI-1 at 27. Whatever the validity
and ease of application of a numbers test, adoption of rigid numbers criteria runs counter to the
underpinnings of the Ralston Purina doctrine. See note 19, supra, and the accompanying dis.
cusion. Moreover, a test which requires that the number of owne: not exceed a given number
during a given period still assumes restrictions on transferability. See ALI FED, S19CURITIIS
CODE § 227(b)(1)(13) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). Most important is the absolute limitation
on the number of those "who purchase securities of the issuer" (not from the issuer) contained
in Proposed Rule 146(f).
43 Le., subject to ad hoc determination.
44 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
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more emphasis on the original offeree's actions and less emphasis on the
issuer's conduct and intent. By 1970, the Commission was moved to
announce its renewed interest in legends and stop-transfer instructions:
The Division will regard the presence or absence of an appropriate leg-
end and stop-transfer instructions as a factor in considering whether the
circumstances surrounding the offering are consistent with the exemption
under Section 4(2) of the Act45
Because the 1970 release repeated that the existence of a public offer-
ing is a question of fact and that the crucial test is where the securities
come to rest,4" it is still the law that legends and investment letters (and
stop-transfer instructions) do not without more constitute a private offer-
ing. 7  Moreover, the apparent emphasis of the Commission on the issuer
may be little more than recognition of the value of the restriction de-
vices as useful in policing' s compliance with the Securities Act. This
interpretation is consistent with the Commission's statement released the
day before its notice of adoption of Rule 144:
In the opinion of the Commission, [Securities Act § 17 (a), Exchange
Act § 10(b)] are violated when an issuer, a person in a control relation-
ship with an issuer, or any other person, in connection with the private
placement of securities, fails to inform the purchaser fully as to the cir-
cumstances under which he is required to take and hold the securities 49
The same release noted that Rule 144 is one of the circumstances of which
the purchaser "should" be informed and reiterated its "strong recom-
mendation" for use of legends and stop-transfer instructions.r °
45 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970).
46d.
47 United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 850 (1967). In the context of Rule 144, the Commission has emphasized the issuer's
responsibilities in response to the question
whether an issuer, in transferring shares in reliance upon Rule 144, may safely rely on
the representations of a shareholder that he is in compliance with the requirements of
the rule. The staff is of the opinion that Rule 144 does not alter the basic obligation
of an issuer not to participate in, or otherwise foster, an illegal distribution under the
1933 AcL The particular procedures an issuer may wish to adopt in order to insure
compliance with the rule are within the discretion of that issuer, and the respoasibility
for the effectiveness of such procedures lies with it. Accordingly, each individual issuer
will have to make its own determination as to what steps are necessary to prevent an
illegal distribution under Rule 144.
SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Apr. 14, 1972, CCH FED. SEc L REP. 5 78,754 (emphasis
added).
48 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). A recent Commission response to
a Rule 144 inquiry laid stress on the issuer's responsibility as in the nature of policing action:
The burden of policing the utilization of the exemption provided by Section 4(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the determination of the specific means by which this is
accomplished rests ultimately with the issuer of the securities involved.
SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Apr. 12, 1972, CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 78,745.
49 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226, Exchange Act Release No. 9444 (Jan. 10, 1972).
5old. Characteristically, the Commission failed to make complete the statement of its intent
If issuer failure to legend certificates, for example, is important enough to invoke the anti.fraud
1972]
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B. Liability under the Anti-Fraud Provisions for Failure
to Use Legends and Stop-Transfer Instructions
Whether the Commission's emphasis on transfer restricting devices is
merely a recognition of the policing value of those devices or foretells a
change in the emphasis of the private offering criteria, the statement that
an issuer who fails to fully inform the purchaser of the "circumstances"
violates the anti-fraud provisions is not a statement to be taken lightly.
First, the language of the release suggests that the prudent issuer"' will
include in the letter of investment intent a recital of knowledge of the
restrictions imposed by Rule 144 (to be distinguished from issuer-imposed
restrictions). Even though it is unlikely that the private placement offeree
would be prosecuted for violation of the anti-fraud provisions, his re-
sale of unregistered securities under circumstances showing less than full
disclosure would certainly justify civil remedies. The veiled threat in the
Commission's statement, then, could result in more offeree care in the sale
of securities purchased in private placement.
Second, given circumstances suggesting more than sheer ignorance of
the law, liability for failure to give notice of restrictions may be consistent
with the objectives of the Securities and Exchange Acts and may be a fur-
ther step toward increasing liability under Rule 10b-5. On one hand, it
is true that transfer restrictions are not strictly speaking information on
the financial condition of the issuer disclosed by a prospectus. " On the
other hand, the restrictions imposed by Rule 144 are certainly as impor-
tant to many unsophisticated investors as is "financial" information; it
does not require a long step to reach the conclusion that failure to dis-
close is "an act or practice ... which ... would operate as a fraud or deceit
• . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."" This
argument is given additional force with the observation that the prospec-
tus does contain detailed information on the securities offered;"4 at least as
much protection for the investor in private placement would demand dis-
closure of the restrictions imposed by Rule 144." ; In short, it is not diffi-
cult to call the transfer restrictions imposed by law a material fact of in-
terest to the investor, and to call the omission or misrepresentation of that
provisions, surely it is important enough for the Commission to req-Are as a matter of presump-
tive definition of private placement. The Commission may have reached this position In Pro-
posed Rule 146, under which the issuer's requisite knowledge is nonawareness of underwriter
status, 146(g)(1), but which provides that "reasonable care shall include" legends, stop.transfcr
orders, and letters of intent, 146(g)(2) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, the absolute numbers
standard of Rule 146(f) applies to purchasers, not offerees.
51 This point raises again the issuer's difficulty in selling his securities at a high percentage
of market value.
52 Securities Act, Schedules A, B. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970).
53 SEC Rule lOb-5(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1971). See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States, 92 S. Ct. 1456 (1972), and notes 60 and 67 infra, for judicial recognition of
this conclusion.
54 Securities Act Schedule A(9), (10). 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970).
55 The Commission's broad rule-making power is further support for the positior-at least in
a practical sense. Securities Act § 19.
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fact sufficient to establish a cause of action under the anti-fraud provi-
sions.
Third, the specific infusion of the anti-fraud provisions into the context
of restriction devices may have substantial effects on the relationship of the
issuer to its underwriter, transfer agent and attorney. For example, where
the courts will not enforce an indemnity contract in favor of an under-
writer who knows of misleading statements contained in an offering cir-
cular"s it does not shock the conscience to withhold indemnification from
the knowledgeable actor who engages in misleading conduct with re-
spect to lawful transfer restrictions. If a Rule 10b-5 violation is to be writ-
ten into failure to disclose transfer restrictions imposed by law, more than
indemnification contracts may be affected. If an underwriting agreement
containing a misleading prospectus is unenforceable as against the under-
writer with knowledge of the misleading facts,r7 the issuer which fails
to disclose restrictions on transfer may find itself with an unenforceable
contract.
Perhaps the most startling effect of the infusion of the anti-fraud pro-
visions into this context, however, could be in the area of continued re-
definition of the role of the issuer's and/or underwriter's attorney. While
violation of the liabilities given so much attention after Escott v. Bar-
Chris Construction Co. 8 are not directly applicable to the failure to use
transfer restricting devices, 9 the apparent increasing tendency of the
courts to view "securities attorneys" as independent contractors and not
advocate agents is of vital significance to potential malpractice liability. °
56 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
-57Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856
(1952).
58 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
59 As to false and misleading statements or omissions in a registration statement. Securities
Act § 11.
60 S. SCHULMAN, RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ATrORNEY, EMERGING FEDERAL SECURITES
LAw: POTENTIAL LIABILnY 177 (Nordin, ed. 1969); see also the National Student action which,
significantly enough, was brought under the anti-fraud provisions. Wall Street J., Feb. 4, 1972,
at 6 (Midwest ed.). Similarly, the transfer agent who "knows or has reason to know that an il-
legal [under Rule 144] distribution would occur" has the duty to take affirmative action, SEC,
Div. of Corp. Fin. Letter of Apr. 12, 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 78,745, as does the trans-
fer agent who makes a market. Affiliated Ure Citizens of Utah v. United States, 92 S. Ct. 1456(1972). While Affiliated Ute Citizens may increase transfer agent responsibility under Rule
10-b(5), the Court's opinion could foretell increased potential liability of all professionals, in-
cluding counsel, who are involved in transfer of securities restricted by the Securities Act or by
legend. In pertinent part, Afliated UtVe Citizens involved defendants who were market making
officer/directors of a bank which was the transfer agent and sole depository for legended certif-
icates distributed to members of the Ue nation. The officers allegedly misrepresented the value
of the securities and failed to explain adequately the right of first refusal legended thereon. On
the facts of the misrepresentations and the officers' position as market makers and in sole pos-
session of the certificates the Court found liability under Rule 10-b(5) absent proof of actual re-
liance:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive
proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts
withheld be material in the sense that a xeasonable investor might have considered them
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If the Commission's application of the anti-fraud provisions is to be read
this far, the attorney who permits his client to ignore the legend and
stop-transfer instruction is courting disaster for that client and for him-
self. Because of investor reluctance to accept legended stock, it is unfor-
tunate that the Commission failed to make the requirement absolute-at
the very least such absoluteness would have made easier the task of edu-
cating issuers to the law and would have put knowledgeable and not-so-
knowledgeable securities counsel on a more equal footing.
Fourth, and finally, the effect of infusion of the anti-fraud provisions
into transfer restrictions will depend in part upon what language of those
provisions is read into the Securities and Exchange Acts. If, as the lan-
guage of the release suggests, 61 the Commission views this failure to dis-
close as a deceptive act or practice under Rule lob-5(3), presumably the
remedy available would be in damages. If, however, such omission were
viewed as omission to state a material fact under Rule lob-5(2), then the
anti-fraud provisions of both the Securities 2 and Exchange Acts 8 argu-
ably would be violated.64  Moreover, if lack of knowledge (actual or
constructive) on the part of the purchaser were proven, recision rights
could be available to all offerees 5 under § 12(2) of the Securities Act.60
The difference in § 12(1) and § 12(2) illustrates the problem in an
analogous way. Is omission of notice of restrictions imposed by law,
without more, a violation of § 5 of the Securities Act? Logic would
not require this because securities validly placed under § 4(2), for exam-
ple, are not immune from the provisions of Rule 144. However, as a
matter of issuer liability-and not of disqualification under § 4(1) through
§ 2(11)-the conclusion could be the opposite. If, as discussed at the
beginning of this section, the recent pronouncements of the Commission
reflect a greater emphasis on issuer action as opposed to offeree intent,
then failure to take action reasonably expected to prevent distribution to
important in making this decision.... This obligation to disclose and this withhold-
ing of a matrial fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.
92 S. Ct at 1472 (emphasis added). The Court's opinion should be considered carefully by any
professional who, as a source of information not possessed by his client, counsels that client to
undertake activity identified by the Commission as fraudulent in connection with the sale of a
security.
61 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226, Exchange Act Release No. 9444 (Jan. 10, 1972),
62 Securities Act § 17.
63 Exchange Act § 10.
64 A uillful violation of the rule so construed could result in criminal liability. Securities
Act § 24, Exchange Act § 32(a).
65 Perhaps as limited to their immediate purchasers, Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841
n.3 (2d Cir. 1968), citing 185 F. Supp. 943, 946 (S.D. Cal. 1960), a limitation which would
serve to place a sanction on the offeree who through secondary distribution causes the issuer to
lose the private placement exemption.
06 This distinction could be important with regard to difficulties in proving damages, given
that punative damages are not likely in the foreseeable future. See Globus v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
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the uninformed public (i.e., use of legends, stop-transfer instructions and
letters of investment intent) could be construed to be a violation of the
anti-fraud provisions of the Act, without the finding of a public distribu-
tion and a violation of § 5 of the Securities Act, where a public distribu-
tion results. Indeed, the infusion of the anti-fraud provisions into the
restrictions imposed by Rule 144 would seem to make sense only follow-
ing this latter conclusion. Unless the failure to give notice of the restric-
tions absent a public distribution is an independent violation of the anti-
fraud provisions, the Commission's release has no teeth, because with a
violation of § 5 the whole range of federal remedies is otherwise avail-
able. 7
It is to be hoped that much of the foregoing will be rendered aca-
demic by universal application and use of the three restriction devices in
private offerings. Indeed, preclusion of the application of the anti-fraud
provisions is ridiculously simple. Having considered some possibilities of
application of the Commission's recent proclamations on the use of re-
striction devices both in terms of the point of focus for determination of
public distribution vis-4-vis the issuer and in terms of the anti-fraud pro-
visions of the Securities and Exchange Acts, it is now appropriate to con-
sider the effectiveness of the devices in the context of federal securities
law. What can the issuer do to insure against potentially staggering lia-
bility ?
C. The Effectiveness of Restrictive Legends, Stop-Transfer Instructions
and Letters of Investment Intent in the Context of Federal Law
The following section of this discussion will examine the ability of
the issuer to restrict the transferability of securities so completely that its
offerees are unable to transfer title. The theory goes that if the issuer,
for example, can preclude its offerees from transfering title to the pri-
vately placed shares, then no offer is possible and the risk of public distri-
bution is foreclosed.0 8 While the possibility of this solution should be
kept in mind from this point on, the immediate section of the discussion
is concerned with the effect of the three restriction devices more or less
exclusive of problems of ownership under states' law.
Because the use of legends and stop-transfer orders is strongly recom-
67 See Abdelnour v. Coggeshall & Hicks, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 93,340 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
14, 1972), recognizing a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations on
marketability of restricted shares. A possible exception to this might be the instance where a
violation of the anti-fraud provisions is more easily proved than a public distribution, under
the facts of a particular case. One other point is worthy of examination. Use of Release No.
5226 to argue for an emphasis on issuer action, coupled with a strict reading of Rule 144, if
carried to a logical extreme could lead to the desirable result of limiting issuer liability to is-
suer conduct inconsistent with the intent of § 4(2) of the Securities Act. Given issuer compli-
ance with the strong suggestion of the recent releases there is no reason to expand issuer liabil-
ity for offerees' actions over which it has no control. The force of this point is emphasized by
language in Proposed Rule 146 dictating use of the three restrictive devices. See note 50 supra.
68 See (. ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE § 16.04 (2d ed. 1969) and section V infra.
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mended, 9 because use thereof will be considered as a factor in finding the
fact of private distribution7 ° and because failure to advise of restrictions
on transfer imposed by law may precipitate anti-fraud provision liabil-
ity,7 compliance with the Commission's "strong" recommendation is the
only prudent course. Use of the three devices, moreover, should be rec-
ognized as an avoidance to any claim of fraudulent practice or omission
of material fact. Given good faith compliance with the Commission's
recommendation72 and adequate demonstration of disclosure, 7 there is no
reason to find issuer liability for fraudulent activity. 74
Absent the anti-fraud problem, the major function of the restrictive
legend and the stop-transfer instruction in the context of federal law is
notice.75 By providing notice of private offering to prospective offerees
the issuer demonstrates intent through recommended action consistent
with the § 4(2) exemption to registration. Similarly, although omitted
from the Commission's recommended action, through the letter acknowl-
edging that he is familiar with the nature of the offering and the restric-
tions of Rule 144 and that he understands that "any person" engaging in
secondary distribution of privately placed securities without giving notice to
the secondary offeree is acting fraudulently,7 the original offeree both evi-
dences his participation in a private placement77 and may be reminded of
his own potential liability.
The question of offeree indemnification of the issuer as evidenced by
the letter of intent is worthy of some attention at this point. The recent
Commission emphasis on the fraudulent nature of failure to give notice of
restrictions on transfer suggests that if the issuer does not comply with
the Commission recommendations it may have difficulty in enforcing an
69 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
70 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970).
71 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226, Exchange Act Release No, 9444 (Jan. 10, 1972).
72See by analogy the last sentence of Securities Act § 19(a) (acts done in good faith in con.
formity with rule or regulation of Commission are valid).
73 This suggests that consideration might be given to expanding the legend to include lan-
guage directed more pointedly at Rule 144. While demonstration of original offeree intent
may be covered by the letter (a purpose perhaps reflected in the recent alternative label "non-
distribution letter"), notice to potential secondary offerees would be assured by slight expansion
of the legend.
74 Again, had the Commission taken a direct route (which it often avoids), had it poclaimed
that absence of legend and stop-transfer order would be presumptive evidence against the fact of
private distribution, this problem would not have arisen.
75 This point also implies notice to prospective purchasers and to their dealers in respect to
the tide provisions of Article 8. See the discussion of U.C.C. § 8-204 in section V itra.
76 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226, Exchange Act Release No. 9444 (Jan. 10, 1972).
This again suggests the inclusion of appropriate language in the letter of intent, another factor
to be negotiated prior to closing.
77 C. ISRAELs, CoRPORAxt PRAcncu § 16.11 (2d ed. 1969). But see United States v. Custer
Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967).
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indemnification contract with its offerees.1 8 Thus, even if the offeree
signs a letter which recites an agreement to indemnify79 the issuer for ex-
penses occasioned by liability for registration or recision under §§ 5 and
12 of the Securities Act,80 the validity of the agreement should be ques-
tioned unless the particular offeree's actions are the reason for issuer lia-
bility. If the issuer is not blameless-which is not to say culpable-of-
feree conduct should not justify enforcement of an indemnification agree-
ment.
81
The issuer will have similar difficulties in limiting through use of the
restriction devices its liability under § 12 of the Securities Act. Initially
it may be noted that an in pari delicto defense to § 12 liability has been
rejected even as asserted against an offeree who participated in the dis-
tribution. 2 The judicial unwillingness to permit issuer limitations on §
12 liability by agreement follows an arguably too broad reading of Wilko
v. Swan,'a in which the Supreme Court read § 14 of the Securities Act to
preclude an arbitration agreement limitation on application of § 12(2).
In the case of the blameless issuer as against the distributing offeree the
WIilko doctrine could be modified without violence to the language or pur-
pose of the Securities Act. First, § 14 precludes waivers of "compliance
with any provision";8 4 it does not preclude limits on assertion of a right
to recision. Second, while agreement to arbitrate may infringe upon court
jurisdiction over alleged violations of the Securities Act,"' prospective
waiver of a right of recision for an offeree whose own conduct will violate
the Act, while the issuer's will not, does no violence to the jurisdiction of
the courts, because proof of the ancient "clean hands" in the application of
this equitable remedy would imply court involvement. Finally, the aims of
78 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) (by analogy, knowl-
edge of misstatements precludes underwriter indemnity).
79 An indemnification limited in the first instance by the depth of the offerec's pocket.
SO As recommended by C. Israels, Some Commcrcial Overtones of Prirate Placement, 45
VA. L REV. 851 (1959), rev. in SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL. SECUITIES LAW 125, 138
n.65 (ABA 1968).
8 1 Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 344 U.S. 856
(1952) (by analogy; underwriting agreement unenforceable as against public policy against an
underwriter with knowledge of misleading statements). Parenthetically, it may be that the
broker dealer does not come off so well; the broker's exemption will be denied where the broker
has knowledge that the issuer is engaged in public distribution. In re Quinn & Co., SEC Se-
curities Exchange Act Release No. 9062 (Jan. 25, 1971). Sce also In the Matter of Stone, Sum-
mer & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9839 (Nov. 3, 1972) and note 60 .supra.
8 2 Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964). It should be noted,
however, that there was no question before that court that the distribution violated § 5 of the
Securities Act. A distinguishing feature, albeit a weak one, may exist where the offeree against
whom the defense is asserted is the sole reason for issuer violation of § 5. Sce Demarco v.
Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968) citing 185 F. Supp. 943, 946 (S.D. Cal. 1960), as
to an immdiate offeree limitation on § 12 remedies.
83 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
8 Securities Act § 14 (emphasis added).
8 5 Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953).
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the securities laws are not served by allowing offerees who knowingly
engage in secondary distributions to profit from their misconduct.
Whatever the validity of the foregoing, the current outlook for issuer
contractual limitation of liability is bleak at best. As has been outlined,
however, the private placement issuer can substantially reduce potential
liability arising out of the risk of public offering if it makes full use of
legends, stop-transfer orders and letters of investment intent.8 0 This is
not to suggest that if the private placement issuer fails to employ the de-
vices it is per se in violation of either § lob of the Exchange Act or § 5
of the Securities Act. Faced with the risk of public distribution, however,
the issuer can make drastic reductions in the scope of its potential liabil-
ity if it employs the three transfer restricting devices. By contrast, fail-
ure to employ the devices may help precipitate disaster in the forms of
(1) recision rights in favor of all offerees,87 (2) prosecution for willful
violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts, 88 (3) liability to its transfer
agent,89 (4) liability under the anti-fraud provisions, 0 and (5) consider-
able examination by federal (and state) agencies with attendant public
embarrassment. It may be noted that the careless attorney for the issuer
is courting liability under the anti-fraud provisions and possibly a mal-
practice actionY1
An example of the nightmarish possibilities flowing from failure to
employ the restrictive devices is provided by Mattson v. Medical Develop.
ment Corp.92 One of defendant Medical Development's shareholders
owned 5,000 shares distributed under the private placement exemption
to § 5 of the Securities Act, 1,000 of which were unlegended. Plaintiff
shareholder apparently sought to dispose of his unlegended shares but
was prevented from completing the transaction because of Medical De-
velopment's stop-transfer instruction to its transfer agent. The shareholder
brought an action in state court, established his status as a bona fide pur-
chaser without notice and won an order to the transfer agent to convert
the shares to unrestricted. Meanwhile, Medical Development was in-
formed by the Commission that failure to retain the restriction in force
88 Full use implies full planning, it is unwise to introduce the legend and investment letter at
closing. It is worthy of note that effective (but subject to considerations set forth in notes 73 and
76 supra) forms for private placements are set forth in Appendix B of C. ISRAE3LS & I!, GUTr.
MAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS (rev. ed. 1971). Sample certificate legends and an
aagreement to register under § 5 of the Securities Act are set forth in WHEN CORPORATIONS
Go PUBLIC 21-23, Appendix A at 256 (C. Israels & G. Duff, eds., PLI 1962).
87 Securities Act § 12. But see note 82 supra. See F. Klink, Compliance with the Securities
Act of 1933, How To Do A PRIVATE OFFERING-UsING VENTURE CAPITAL 121, 124 (A.
Sommer, ch., PLI 1970).
88 Securities Act § 24, Exchange Act § 32(a).
89 See section IV infra.
90 Securities Act § 17; Exchange Act § 10b.
91 See the discussion in Section IIIB supra, particularly at note 60.
92 329 F. Supp. 304 (D. Utah 1971) (a case citing neither Article 8 nor the Securities Act),
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would result in a violation of federal law. Medical Development then
obtained a stay of the state court order and brought a third party com-
plaint against the Commission which was removed to federal court. The
reported opinion is the court's dismissal on Commission motion of that
complaint. The federal court, informed by the Commission that a no-
action letter would not be issued, 3 remanded to the state court noting
that the latter forum had better opportunity to rectify the difficulties pre-
sented. 4
Medical Development illustrates that failure to legend certificates can
result, in the broadest sense, in a state court order to violate federal law.
The examination of the state law under which such orders may be given,
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, comprises the remainder of
this discussion. Again, it should be kept in mind that a central question
is whether Article 8 can provide adequate protection for the private place-
ment issuer.95
IV. ARTICLE EIGHT GENERALLY9 8
'A. The Intent and Coverage of Article 817
"Article Eight's overriding objective is to confer full negotiability upon
all investment securities .... ,,18 Thus, securities governed by the article
are negotiable instruments.99  The Article is "private law,"'10 and is
93 The court certainly could not have denied the motion under the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine. 329 F. Supp. at 306.
94 While this position may be defensible in the context of these facts, it has serious limha-
dons because state courts by expertise are hardly in a position to determine qualification for
exemption from § 5 of the Securities Act, although such actions would normally fall within
the concurrent jurisdiction provisions of § 22(a).
95 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that state law restrictions were utilized fully in se-
curities practice.
6Explanadons of Article 8 generally include- C. BUNN, IL SNEAD & R. SPEIDEL, AN
INTRODUCEION TO THE UNIPORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3.18-3.24 (1964); F. Guttman,
Article 8-Investment Securities, 17 RuTGERs L REv. 136 (1962); C. Israels, Inrestment Seem-
rities Problems-Article 8 of the U.C.C., 11 How. LJ. 120 (1965); C. Israels, Investment Securi-
ties in New York: Statutory Text and Commercial Practice, 48 CORNELL LQ. 108 (1962); C.
Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper, 13 Bus. LAw. 676 (1958), in UNIFORM
COMMERCIA1. CODE HANDBOOK 211 (ABA 1964); T. Jolls, Investment Securities, 22 BUS.
LAW. 734 (1967); F. Leary, Security Issues and Transfers Under the Uniform Commerdail
Code, 2 U.C.C.L.J. 7 (1969); W. Wyatt, Investment Securities-Article 8 of the Uniform Cox-
mercial Code, 48 KY. L.J. 333 (19(0). One excellent work discusses the premise underlying
Article 8 in some depth. E. Folk, Article 8: A Premise and Three Problems, 65 MIcH L REV.
1379 (1967).
97 Three preliminary points are worthy of note prior to discussion of the Code. First, the sec-
tion captions are part of the Code. U.C.C. § 1-109. Second, the Code imposes an obligation
of good faith, U.C.C. § 1-203, and while the effect of the provisions of the Code may be varied
by agreement, this obligation may not be disclaimed. U.C.C. § 1-102(3). Third, "t]ibe Code
is the legislation; the Comments are not." R. NORDSTROM & N. LATriN, SALES AND SEcURED
TRANSACrIONS 17-18 (1968).
98E. Folk, Article Eight: A Premise and Three Problems, 65 MICEL L REV. 1379, 1379
(1967).
9 9 U.C.C. § 8-105(1).
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"neither a Blue Sky law nor a corporation code."''1 1 The Article continues
the long standing view of certificates as personal property and evidence
of the shareholder's interest in the issuing company. 1 2
The Article 8 definition of security is one of function and not of form:
A "security" is an instrument which (i) is issued in bearer or registered
form; and (ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges
or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or
dealt in as a medium for investment; and (iii) is either one of a class or
series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series of instruments; and
(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an
enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer.103
It is immediately evident that the Article 8 definition of a security is not
so broad as is that contained in the Securities Act.'04  Thus while a con-
tract for the sale of undivided interests in land could be a security under
the Securities Act, 05 that contract probably would not be subject to
Article 8. On the other hand, any instrument qualifying as a security
under Article 8 would fit within the Securities Act.' One federal court
suggested, but did not hold, that savings and loan association certificates
are covered by Articles 3 and 8.107
While Article 8 makes securities negotiable,10 8 it should not be assumed
that "negotiable" has the same meaning or effect in Article 8 as in Arti-
cle 3. There is some similarity, for example, in the presumption in favor
of validity of signatures,0 9 which has lead at least one court both to ob-
serve that Article 8 is insufficiently detailed, requiring the application of
Article 3 to arrive at the conclusion that a principal could not be a holder
in due course if its agent were not."0 This conclusion, if extended, could
result in an allocation of loss more consistent with Article 3's scheme
100 Which makes questionable a prediction employing an analogy to BarChris liability for
failure to investigate. F. Leary, Security Issues and Transfers Under the Unilorm Commercdal
Code, 2 U.C.C.LJ. 7 (1969).
101U.C.C. § 8-101 Comment.
102 See, e.g., Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Mach. Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 256, 86 A. 1026 (1913).
103 U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a); C. BUNN, H. SNEAD & R. SPEIDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.18. "Registered form" is defined in U.CC. § 8.102(1)(c).
104 Compare Securities Act § 2(1).
10 5 See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
106 C. Israels, Stop-Transfer Procedures and the Securities Act of 1933-Addendum to Uni-
form Commercial Code-Article 8, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 158 (1962), rev. in SELECTED ARTI-
CLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw 231, 232 (ABA 1968).
107 Abraham Lincoln Ins. Co. v. Franklin Say. & Loan Ass'n, 302 F. Supp, 54 (E.D. Mo.
1969). An interesting approach given the mutual exclusiveness of the two articles. See note
112 infra.
08 U.CC § 8-105(1).
109U.C.C. §§ 3-307, 8-105(2).
110 E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 259 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Mich. 1966),
noted in 6C W. WILMER and F. HART, U.C.C. REP.-DIGEST 5 2-1459, A3 (1972). Moreover, the
case involved warrants, which are included within the scope of Article 8. U.C.C § 8-102
Comment.
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than with Article 8's. Excessive use of Article 3 to interpret Article 8 may
lead to unfortunate results. 1 ' First, bot harticles provide for the exclusive
application of Article 8 to negotiable securities."-' Moreover, Article 8s
functional definition of investment securities differs from Article 3's form
definition of negotiable instruments;"' the former article does not employ
the holder in due course concept while the latter does;"' the former rec-
ognizes issuer limitations on transferability while speaking generally the
latter prohibits such limitations on negotiability by definition.1 5 These
comparisons suggest that in investment securities cases where Article 3
and the law antecedent to Article 8 conffict, the result consistent with the
latter is preferable."'
B. Transfer and the Bona Fide Purchaser
Both indorsement and delivery 17 are required for transfer of a securi-
ty," 8 although as between immediate parties a delivery without indorse-
ment is effective and confers a right to compel indorsement" and thus
transfer. By the same token an indorsement in blank without delivery
will not constitute a transfer. 120  While courts often speak of the process
of registration by the issuer or its transfer agent as "transfer," this term
is not descriptive of the process. The agent registers (not to be confused
with registration under § 5 of the Securities Act) the transfer;' 21 he does
not and cannot effect or approve transfer. After "the security is both
indorsed and delivered, the 'transfer' as between the parties is complete,
whether or not the issuer has recognized the fact of change of owner-
ship."'122 Thus the change of ownership does not depend upon lack of reg-
istration on the issuing corporation's books,tm  and death of a transferor
between delivery and registration has no effect on the validity of the
I T. Jolls, Investment Securities, 22 Bus. LAw. 734 (1967).
112 U.C.C. §§ 3-101, 3-103(1), 3-103 Comment 2, 8-102(1)(b).
11 Compare U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)witb U.C.C. §§ 3-104(1) and 3-105-111.
114 U.C.C. § 3-302. This observation notwithstanding, a New Jersey court in setting forth a
broker's lack of affirmative duty to cancel a transaction on behalf of its customer stated that the
purchaser was a holder in due course with respect to the securities transferred. White v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 565, 218 A.2d 655 (1966) citing
N.J.S. 12A: 3-302.
315 Compare U.C.C. § 8-204 uith U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 105.
116 See generally C Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper, 13 BUS. IAW. 676
(1958), in UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 211 (ABA 1964).
"1U.C.C. § 1-201(14).
18 U.C.C. § 8-309; Liss v. Liss, 355 Mass. 787, 243 N .E.2d 923 (1969).
19 U.C.C. § 8-307; Goldammer v. Fredricks, 70 Il. App. 2d 398, 217 N.B.2d 290 (1966).
120 Whitfield v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 262 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
12 U.C.C. § 8-401(1). Which suggests that from the standpoint of state law, the Commis-
sion's emphasis on stop-transfer orders may be overdone.
12 2 C. Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper, 13 BUs. LAw. 676 (1958), in
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 211,218 (ABA 1964).
123 Toigo v. Ross, 107 M1L App. 2d 395, 246 N.F-2d 68 (1969).
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transfer. 24  Moreover, record ownership is not a requisite to the owner's
enforcement of his rights under the certificate.' It follows, then, that
the issuer which legends its certificates with a phrase such as "transfer-
able only on the books of the corporation" has wasted its ink.120
This distinction between transfer and registration of transfer is the
reason for the state court's order in Medical Development 2 ' that the
transfer agent register transfer even in the face of assertions that the
Commission would look upon the registration as a violation of the Se-
curities Act. One of the requisites to imposing the issuer's duty to register
transfer is that "the transfer is in fact rightful or is to a bona fide pur-
chaser."'2' Thus a bona fide purchaser satisfying § 8-401 may compel
registration of a transfer which is not rightful. "Bona fide purchaser"
is defined as "a purchaser for value 29 in good faith'8 0 and without notice
of any adverse claim who takes delivery . . . ."I" The bona fide pur-
chaser takes the security free of any adverse claim,"12 whereas the limited
purchaser's interest 3' may not include the right to compel registration of
transfer. Accordingly, the question of bona fide purchaser status is one of
fact, 34 and where certificates were issued without authority the right of
the purchaser to compel registration of transfer turned on notice and
knowledge 15 as a question of fact." 6
The issuer is subject to liability for wrongful registration of transfer,87
and the duty to register"38 is accompanied by liability for unreasonable
delay3 9 or failure to register. 4 The issuer's liability for failure to regis-
124 Wade-Corry Co. v. Moseley, 223 Ga. 474, 156 S.E.2d 64 (1967).
12 5 New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Old Colony Trust Co., 356 Mass. 612, 254 N.I,2d
891 (1970).
126 C. Israels, Investment Securities Problems-Article 8 of the U.C.C., 11 HOW. LJ. 120,
127 (1965). Although such a legend might be construed as a contract between issuer and pur-
chaser, it will not affect transfer or validity of the security. See U.C.C. § 8-202(1).
127 Mattson v. Medical Dev. Corp., 329 F. Supp. 304 (D. Utah 1971). See the discussion
accompanying notes 92 to 95 supra.
12 8 U.C.C. § 8-401(1) (e) (emphasis added).
129 U.C.C. § 1-201(44).
130 U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
131 U.C.C. § 8-302 (footnotes added).
132U.C.C. § 8-301(2).
33U.C.C. § 8-301(3).
"34 Gwatney v. Allied Companies, Inc., 238 Ark. 962, 385 S.W.2d 940 (1965), United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Goetz, 285 N.Y. 74, 32 N.E.2d 798, 27 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1941).
1U.C.C. § 1.201(25-27).
186 Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Otis Oil & Gas Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Colo. 1968).
3"7 U.C.C. § 8-404(2).
"38 U.C.C. § 8_401(1).
139 Holmes v. Birtman Elec. Co., 18 IIl. 2d 554, 165 N.E.2d 261 (1960) (action by survivor
joint tenant against transfer agent; five month delay is unreasonable).
140 U.C.C. § 8-401(2); see generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 746 (1961) ("Right or duty of
corporation to refuse to transfer stock on presentation of properly indorsed certificates, because of
conflicting rights or claims of one other than transferee").
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ter the transfer or for delay in registration is dependent, however, upon
proof of damages, 141 and does not include counsel fees. 42 Privately
placed securities acquired as collateral on a debt may raise the issue of
issuer liability for failure to register' but, again, bona fide purchaser
status is required to compel the registration. 44 The transfer agent is liable
to the holder jointly with the issuer for failure to register transfer 4 ' but
proof of loss is a requisite to recovery of damages.4' The transfer agent
is required, however, to act within a reasonable time if it is to avoid lia-
bility, and delay occasioned by an issuer president's personal whim and
agent failure to recognize a Commission no-action letter is unjustified de-
lay.' 47
V. TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
ARTICLE EIGHT' 4 8
A. Provisions for Restriction on Transfer
The issuer's ability to restrict transfer of its securities antedates the
Code. The common law and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act permitted
141 Berman v. Airlift Int'l, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (right of action rec-
ognized; motion for summary judgment granted because no damages). See Also Riskin v. Na-
tional Computer Analysts, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 605, 308 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1970); Linder v. Con-
tinental Stock Transfer Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 91,614
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
142 Rosenberg v. Nathan Benjamin, Inc., 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 188 (1969). U.C.C. § 8.204,
Comment 3.
14 3 Branerton Corp. v. United States Corp., 34 App. Div. 2d 1, 309 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1970)
(remanding on defendant's assertion that a "no-action" letter was required). The application of
Rule 144, however, may reduce the monetary value of the right of a lending institution to com-
pel registration of transfer. See note 39 supra.
144 Brown v. Rosetti, 66 Misc. 2d 239, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1971) (factor firm which took
stolen securities outside the "usual course of business" failed to qualify as a bona fide purchaser).
'45U.C.C. § 8-406; U.C.C. § 8-406, Comment 1; Welland Investment Corp. v. First Natil
Bank, 81 N.J. Super. 180, 195 A.2d 210 (1963).
146 Bayer v. Airlift Int'l, Inc., 111 NJ. Super, 461,268 A.2d 548 (1970).
14 7 Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965). Parenthetically,
the broker is not a party to this liability; although he may be forced to "cover," U.C.C. § 8-
313(3), his action in good faith will not make him liable in conversion, U.C.C. § 8-318. The
"know your customer rule," however, may impose liability for conversion of stolen securities.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 218, 234 N.E.2d 230, 287 N.Y.S.2d
58 (1967) (decided on N.Y. PERS. PROP. L. § 168 but consistent with Article 8). The broker
is nor subject to the Article 8 statute of frauds. U.C.C. § 8-319; Lindsey v. Stein Bros. & Boyce,
Inc., 59 Tenn. App. 727, 443 S.W.2d 669 (1968). For a discussion of transfer agent liability
under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971), see note 60 supra.
148 Discussions focusing on Article 8 restrictions on transferability in the context of federal
securities law include: C. ISRAELS & B. GUMAN, MODERN SECURMES TRANSFERS (rev. ed.
1971); C. IsRAELs, CORPORATE PRACTiCE §§ 4.33-4.34, 16.01-16.12 (2d ed. 1969); C. Israels,
How to Handle Transfers of Stock, Bonds, and other Investment Securities, 19 BUS. LAW. 90
(1963), in UNiFORM COmMERCAL CODE HANDBOOK 229 (ABA 1964); C. Israels, Stop.Tranl-
fer Procedures and the Securities Act of 1933-Addendum to Uniform Commercial Code-Ar-
tide 8, 17 RuTGERS L REv. 158 (1962), rev. in SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURtrnEs
LAw 231 (ABA 1968); Annor., 21 A.LR.3d 964 (1968) ("Construction and Effect of U.C.C.
Art. 8, Dealing with Investment Securities"); Annot, 75 A.L.R.2d 746 (1961) ("Right or duty
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restrictions on transfer if these were reasonable and not against public
policy, and were accompanied by adequate notice to purchasers.1 49 Thus,
an issuer who failed to register transfer of a security where legal notice
of a reasonable restriction was not given was liable in conversion;"" where
the purchaser took with notice, a reasonable restriction would be sus-
tained.'" ' The two requisites of reasonableness and compliance with public
policy and of notice exist in current law. The first of these is not codi-
fied; the second has been specifically carried into Article 8.
The reasonableness and not against public purpose side of this doc-
trine is rooted in history in the reservation of a right of first refusal, a
restriction of long'52 and continued'53 vitality antedating the Securities
Act. No case has been found in which the validity of restrictions im-
posed to insure issuer compliance with the Securities Act has been discussed.
It is obvious, however, that such restrictions are more or less taken to be
valid within the confines of Article 8. First, however, restrictions on
alienation of securities are not universally favored outside the Code. In
the context of an action for refund of income tax paid, for example, one
court held that transfer for tax purposes was to be reckoned in the year of
execution of an agreement to buy unregistered securities, even though
negotiations were still in progress with the Commission to avoid liability
under § 5 of the Securities Act and there would have been no delivery, "4
and hence no enforceability of the agreement, under Article 8.15 When
coupled with the Securities Act prohibition of public offering, this view of
transferability of securities or interests therein would satisfy violation of §
of corporation to refuse to transfer stock on presentation of properly endorsed certificates, be-
cause of conflicting rights or claims of one other than transferee"); Annor., 29 A,L.R.2d 901
(1935) ("Construction and effect of § 15 of Uniform Stock Transfer Act prohibiting restriction
on transfer of shares unless such restriction is stated in the certificate") (pre-Code history of
U.C.C. § 8-204).
149 Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act required that the restriction be printed on
the certificates. People v. Galskis, 233 111. App. 414 (1924).
1'0 Hulse v. Consolidated Quicksilver Mining Corp., 65 Idaho 768, 154 P.2d 149 (1944).
151Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E.2d 622, 147 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1954).
Other pre-Code cases dealing with reasonableness and notice of restrictions include: In re Con-
solidated Factors Corp., 46 F.2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17
P.2d 706 (1933); Mancini v. Patrizi, 110 Cal. App. 42, 293 P. 828 (1930); Malcolm v. Lake
Sand Corp., 251 I1. App. 499 (1929); New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38
N.E. 432 (1894); Costello v. Farrell, 234 Minn. 453, 48 N.W.2d 557 (1951); Baumohl v,
Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 A. 118 (1924); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534,
141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
152 People v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924).
153 Cimo v. National Motor Club, 237 So. 2d 408 (La. App. Ct. 1970).
154 See section IVB supra. The tax year in question was 1959.
155 Stoner v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. I11. 1970). The Supreme Court has
held through somewhat analogous reasoning that loss-carryback tax refund claims were property
which passed to a trustee in bankruptcy under § 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C §
110(a)(5) (1970); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). However, in this case unlike
Stoner, the Court was dealing with rights assignable under state law.
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5 no matter what the status of restrictive legends, stop-transfer orders
and letters of investment intent.
Second, the language of Article 8 must be strained to support restric-
tions not relating to ownership of securities. The bona fide purchaser
for value may demand registration of even non-rightful transfer,"" sub-
ject to the precondition (among others) that the issuer has no duty to
inquire into adverse claims,'17 which term "includes a claim that a transfer
was or would be wrongful or that a particular person is the owner of or
has an interest in the security."'58  Absent use of a legend or actual knowl-
edge, there is no way for the issuer to avoid registration of transfer
where the purchase is bona fide. But even with use of the legend, there
is some question that the generally accepted legend form relating to trans-
fer restrictions imposed by the Securities Act gives notice of an "adverse
claim" under Article 8 or makes a transfer "wrongful." These two terms
relate, in history and as explained in the comments, to claims of owner-
ship. And even if transfer in violation of the Securities Act is wrongful,
the Comments provide:
If the security is properly indorsed but nevertheless the transfer is in fact
wrongful, there is no duty [to register] unless the transfer is to a bona
fide purchaser .... 159
Third, although well reasoned commentary suggests otherwise,'C the
use of Article 8 to impose restrictions contrary to its basic purpose and
not related to claims of ownership strains the meaning and intent of its
provisions and purpose.""' Whatever the validity of this conclusion, the
private placement issuer cannot foreclose the duty to register transfer
unless it insures that offerees are not bona fide purchasers. This consider-
ation leads to the notice side of the restriction doctrine.
Unless noted conspicuously' 62 on the security a restriction on transfer im-
posed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except
against a person'63 with actual knowledge'0 4 of it.16
156 See Section IVB supra.
157 U.C. § 8-401(1)(c).
1s8U.C.C. § 8-301(1). The comments to this section contain no reference to federal securi-
ties law. Indeed, that law is referenced in the comments to the whole of Article 8 only three
times.
1r9 U.C.C. § 8-401, Comment 3 (emphasis added) citing Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co.,
195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952).
16 0 E. Folk, Article Eight: A Premise and Three Problems, 65 Mci. L REv. 1379, 1399
(1967).
161 This suggests, as Professor Loss suggested some time ago, that a right of first refusal might
be recited in the legend of all offerees whose investment intent motives are suspicious. 1 Loss,
SECURMEs REGULATION 671-73 (1961).
162U.CC § 1-201(10); see C. Israels, Investment Securities Problems-Article 8 of the
U.C.C., 11 How. I.J. 120, 129-31 (1965).
1363U.C.C. § 1-201(30).
164U.C.C. § 1-201(25)-(27).
165 U.C.C. § 8-204 (footnotes added). No state has changed the official text language of this
1972]
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One of the comments to this section assumes that the restriction pro-
vided for will be used to comply with the Securities Act in just this con-
text. 66 Thus, whether or not violation of the Securities Act constitutes a
wrongful transfer or adverse claim, it does not do violence to the drafters'
intent to read as valid restrictions grounded in the Securities Act and ef-
fected through § 8-204. The effect of this statutory notice is of course that
the purchaser of the validly legended certificate is not a bona fide pur-
chaser in relation to the subject of the legend. Similarly, a letter of in-
vestment intent could recite offeree knowledge of the restriction but would
afford the issuer no protection from the claims of secondary offerees.
This consideration in turn raises the question of the circumstances which
will justify imposition of restrictions where the issuer has neglected to
legend the certificates.
B. Transfer Restrictions in the Context of Present Practice
The question of whose counsel is to give the opinion that further
distribution of privately placed shares will not violate the Securities Act",1
has been avoided by recognition of the problem by the securities bar
and by the adoption of Rule 144. The problem of implied offeree con-
sent to receive legended certificates, however, may still have some vitality.
section. 3 IL ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 700-02 (1971); 2 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. (Uniform Commercial Code) 617-22 (West 1968 and Supp. 1972). Moreover, the courts
appear to apply § 8-204 accurately. See, e.g., Sellers v. Sellers, 428 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1967)
(oral contracts for right of first refusal); Perugina v. Samson Land & Dev. Co., 39 Pa, D. & C.2d
500 (1965) (failure to note restriction on shares). U.C.C. § 8-301 is a similar provision re-
specting issuer liens.
'06 U.CC. § 8-204, Comment 3. The comment following notes that the section does not
apply to restrictions imposed by statute. U.C.C. § 8.204, Comment 4. This raises the question
whether the restrictions of which the Commission wants notice given, vis., those imposed by
Rule 144, are imposed by statute on the issuer. The same question in another context may be
posed by state corporation law. For example, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.25(B) (Page
Supp. 1971) provides:
(B) No restriction on the right to transfer shares and no reservation of lien on shares
shall be effective against a transferee of such shares unless there is set forth on the face
or the back of the certificate therefor:
(1) A statement of the terms of such restrictions or reservations; or
(2) A summary of the terms of such restriction or reservation and a statement
that the corporation will mall to the shareholder a copy of such restriction or reserva-
tion without charge within five days after receipt of written request therefor; or
(3) If such restriction or reservation is contained in the articles or regulations
of the corporation, or in an instrument in writing to which the corporation is a party,
a statement to that effect and a statement that the corporation will mail to the share-
holder a copy of such restriction or reservation without charge within five days after
receipt of written request therefor; or
(4) If such restriction or reservation is contained in an instrument in writing
(other than the articles or regulations of the corporation or an instrument in writing
to which the corporation is a party), a statement to that effect identifying the instru-
ment by tide, date, and parties.
It is to be noted that the language set forth does not provide for purchaser actual knowledge, as
does U.C.C. § 8-204.
167 See Petrillo v. Seven Arts Prod., Ltd., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SiC, L,
REP. 3 91,921 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
COMMENTS
Without discussion of the Code or federal law, one court has held that
in the context of an employee stock option plan, the employee's agreement
to acquire for investment and to sell only in compliance with the Securi-
ties Act evidenced consent to receive legended certificates.GS This ap-
proach and conclusion were followed in the context of a private place-
ment to refuse clean certificates in exchange for those legended with the
words: "These shares were acquired for investment purposes. 16
Where an employee in a stock option plan had not understood the nature
of the restrictions attendant to private placement, however, the issuer's
failure to give notice precluded it from transfering legended shares under
the option agreement.10 This result begins to approach the failure to
give notice of restrictions discussed above' 7 ' which the Commission will
look upon as a violation of Rule 10b-5. Without citing the applicable re-
lease,17 2 one court has recently recognized a private right of action'7" under
Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentation of the marketability of shares to be
acquired, even where the offeree had signed a statement that he was tak-
ing for his own account and without intent to distribute.14
The two themes of reasonableness and notice in issuer imposed restric-
tions are brought together in a state court opinion 73 holding invalid
restrictions printed on the certificates but relating to the corporate arti-
cles.176  The court's decision was based upon three grounds: (1) the leg-
end on the front of the certificate referenced the back and the entire
legend was in small print and unclear, i.e., the legend was inconspicuous 7
(2) The restriction was not reasonable because it required the approval
of the New York Stock Exchange prior to transfer, "a third party not in
privity . . . without any criteria for the exchange to be governed by,
in giving or withholding consent, is clearly arbitrary, capricious, and un-
168 General Dev. Corp. v. Catlin, 139 S. 2d 901 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962).
169 Short v. Soil Builders Int'l Corp., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP.
5 91,188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962). This court did discuss the issuer's attempt to comply with the
Securities Act in making a private placement.
170 Altman v. American Foods, Inc., 262 N.C. 671, 138 S.E.2d 526 (1964) (distinguishing
Catlin on the explicitness of the option agreement).
171 See section IIB supra.
172 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226, Exchange Act Release No. 9444 (Jan. 10, 1972).
Understandably since the decision postdates the release by four days.
173 Abdelnour v. Coggeshall & Hicks, CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 3 93,340 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14,
1972) (judgment for defendant over plaintiff's failure to prove reliance). But as to the reliance
issue see Affiliated Ure Citizens of Utah v. United States, 92 S. Ct. 1456 (1972) and notes 60 and
67 supra.
174 The recognition of this right of action is only a step away from the Commission's position
on the applicability of Rule 10b-5 in this context. Clearly, employee stock option plans can and
should be drafted with sufficient care to avoid the difficulty.
175 Ling & Co. v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 470 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
17 6 This in itself does not invalidate a legend under Artide 8. U.C.C. § 8-202(1).
17U.CC. §§ 8-204, 1-201(10).
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reasonable.' 178  (3) The restriction was not valid under the state's corpo.
ration law. The case suggests at the very least that there are limits to the
restrictions which may be imposed by issuers and that drafting legends
for special purposes deserves more than cursory attention.
This discussion has not as yet construed Article 8 to provide complete
insurance for the private placement issuer against the risks of public
distribution. The problems facing state courts called upon to order reg-
istration of transfers allegedly in violation of the Securities Act may be
increased due to recent statements of Commission policy. In recent years
the courts have relied unreservedly on Commission no-action letters in
ordering transfer of registration thereof.170  If the Commission is serious
in its intent not to issue no-action letters in the private placement con-
text,8 0 the state courts will be faced with an even more difficult task" 1
of interpreting federal securities law and Commission pronouncements
in light of Article 8. The alternatives of issuing orders requiring violation
of federal law,8" backing off from decisions on the grounds of inability
to decide federal securities law,183 and misinterpreting Article 8 to permit
an issuer which ignored legends to refuse to register transfer as against
a bona fide purchaser, are as unattractive for the parties and their attor-
neys as these alternatives must be unpalatable to the state courts.18'
Given this situation the question of effectiveness of the three restrict-
ing devices in the private placement situation is again worthy of atten-
tion. Because transfer occurs under Article 8 independent of registra-
tion of it on the transfer agent's books,"' 5 and because a violation of the
Securities Act should not be read into the Article to destroy the rights
of a bona fide purchaser, 80 the effectiveness of restrictive legends, stop-
transfer orders and letters of investment intent should be reviewed briefly.
First, it seems apparent that the Commission is willing to benchmark
transfer at the point of registration of transfer under Article 8.187 From
178 470 S.W.2d at 444.
179 See Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965); Riskin v. Na-
tional Computer Analysts, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 605, 308 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1970); Donlon Vcn.
tures, Inc. v. Avien, Inc., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. S c. L. REP. 5 91,961 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1967).
180 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972); SEC Securities Act Release No,
5186 (Sept. 10, 1971). The evidence to date suggests otherwise. See section IIB supra,
181 The advertised "definiteness" of Rule 144 notwithstanding. See section IIIC supra,
182 Mattson v. Medical Dev. Corp., 329 F. Supp. 304 (D. Utah 1971).
183 Trad v. Hodes, 72 N.J. Super. 306, 178 A.2d 247 (1962).
184 The court's task will be much easier where the control person concept, Securities Act §
2(11), is involved, both because of the absence of direct issuer inv;olvement in public distribu.
tion and because of Rule 144. See Travis Inv. Co. v. Harwyn Publishing Corp., 288 F. Supp.
519 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), for one example of this context.
1 8 5 See section IVB supra.
186 See section VB supra. The effect of a contrary conclusion on marketplace negotiability
of securities would be undesirable at best.
18 7 This is implicit in the Commission's issuance of no-action letters in Mattson v. Medical
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the point of view of issuer liability for public distribution, this is a de-
sirable approach because it gives the issuer at least an opportunity to ne-
gotiate with the maverick offeree before an entire placement is declared
to be in violation of § 5 of the Securities Act. Also, it is difficult to
conceive how the Commission could effectively police secondary distribu-
tions absent examination of and reference to registration on transfer agents'
books.
Second, because most transfers through brokers are registered prior
to delivery, the legend and stop-transfer order will put both the issuer
and the purchaser on notice of impending violation of the Securities Act.
While the buying broker will have remedies in this situation, he will not
deliver the restricted shares188 to his client and can allow the issuer which
has not given notice to avoid public distribution."8 9
Whatever the position of broker and Commissioner, the strength of
rights vested in the bona fide purchaser-a strength called for by consid-
erations of market place negotiability-makes use of a valid legend
nearly mandatory, particularly for the private placement issuer. Only by
issuing legended certificates can the issuer insure that subsequent offerees
do not assert bona fide purchaser rights against it. Moreover, the Com-
mission's call for stop-transfer orders and the "scare" value of the in-
demnifying letter of investment intent justifies use of these additional de-
vices.190
Finally, because of recent Commission infusion of the anti-fraud
provisions into the consideration of failure to notify offerees of transfer
restrictions imposed by federal securities law, issuer liability may be only
a step away from extension to the issuer's attorney. If the securities bar
ignores this bit of reality, the Commission and the courts will not.
VI. CONCUSION
While the Commission's current pronouncements on private offerings
may have increased clarity of application in some sales of unregistered
securities, they have created substantial areas of confusion, particularly
for the small corporation attempting a private placement. Under the
Dev. Corp., 329 F. Supp. 304 (D. Utah 1971); Travis Inv. Co. v. Harwyn Publishing Corp.,
288 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and Trad v. Hodes, 72 N.J. Super. 306, 178 A.2d 247
(1962).
188See, e.g., NASD Uniform Practice Code § 56(a) (irregular delivery), (b) (reclamation
because of transfer agent refusal to register). See also the NASD statement that a Form 144
and the Seller's requisite statement are not proper delivery; transfer of the certificate is required
as well. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Release of May 25, 1972, CCH FD.
SEc. L. REP. 5 78,808.
189 While the buying broker may insist on his customer's rights as a bona fide purchaser and
force the seller's broker to cover, action on warranties, rea U.C.C. § 8.313(3), and recision is
the preferable course to avoid public distribution. C. ISR AES & E. GUTrMAN, MODERN
SEcuRIEs TRANSFERS § 6.07 (rev. ed. 1971).
19 0 See section IIIC supra for additional impact of these devices in the context of federal law.
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body of federal securities law the attractiveness to the investor of pri-
vately placed securities is reduced and potential issuer liability is broad-
ened, particularly under the anti-fraud provisions. Issuer protection af-
forded by Article 8 against the risk of public distribution is less clear
than under prior law. It is clear, however, that the private placement
issuer who permits offerees to take its shares as bona fide purchasers has
incurred substantial risk where there is chance of public distribution. Use
of legended certificates, stop-transfer instructions, and letters of invest-
ment intent is nearly mandatory.
Reliance by both the Commission and the bar on the restrictive de-
vices of Article 8 requires more thorough examination than has previously
been afforded it, because there is some doubt whether that Article pro-
vides the measure of protection which has been assumed. Moreover, the
Commission's announced policy of not issuing no-action letters in the con-
text of private placements may well increase the difficulties of state courts
which must apply Article 8 in the fact of federal securities laws, a task
previously difficult enough given the gaps between the two bodies of laws.
It may be observed that the federal and state bodies of law do not
dovetail perfectly because the Securities Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code reach to different objectives. Employing the exceptions to Code
transferability to comply with the Act may have some as yet unexplored
pitfalls. To this extent, definitions of what constitutes private placement
which were more in tune with possible issuer action would clarify the
law, and delineated but unqualified requirements for the legend, stop-
transfer order and letter of investment intent could create a rebuttable
presumption that a private placement had occurred, thus giving state courts
faced with actions to compel registration of transfer some ground upon
which to determine wrongfulness of transfer. 1"
For the issuer's attorney, it is too obvious to be stated as a conclusion
19 1 The proposal for a single nationwide marketing system, Proposed Securities Transaction
Processing Act of 1972, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. No. 416, Special Rep. (Mar. 27, 1972); Future
Structure of the Securities Markets, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 409, Special Rep. (Feb, 4, 1972),
which grew out of the recently increased numbers of transactions and the paperwork and finan-
cial crises lamented by the Congress, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, 92D CONG, 2D SESS., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY (for the period ended Feb. 4,
1972) (Comm. Print 1972), HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE, 92D CONG., 2D
SEss., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY (Comm. Print 1972), may render moot some of the cut-
rent reliance on the face of the certificate as providing notice of re;trictions on transferability.
So long as the private placement exemption turns in part on offeree intent, however, some means
of issuer protection in the form of a transfer restricting device will still be required. More-
over, a proposed law governing national systems to streamline tran;Ifers gives the Commission
broad rule making power. It is to be hoped that the Commission drafts its rules in light of
Article 8. Consider for example the potential effects on the body of states' commercial law,
specifically negotiability of securities, from Commission action to eliminate by 1976 the negoti-
able security as a means of settlement among brokers and dealers. S. 3876, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 17A(o) (1972). Consider also that some definitions contained in the recent ALI pro-
posed code differ from those contained in Article 8. See, eg., ALl FED. SE3CURITISS CODE §§
216A (commercial paper), 283, 293(a), (b) and (f) (purchase does not include requisition by
gift) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
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that attempts to employ the private placement exemption absent use of
the three transfer restriction devices is most dangerous. Beyond this point,
some additional observations are in order. While the mandatory language
of Proposed Rule 146 concerning use of the three devices will promote ac-
ceptance of such use, the absolute distribution test of § 146(f) (and in the
analogous context of intrastate offerings, the absolute standard of Pro-
posed Rule 147(e) limitations) will guarantee continuing interest in the
protection afforded by Article 8. A right of first refusal both as providing
a basis for adverse claim and as putting the issuer on notice of impending
secondary distribution is worthy of consideration. Whatever the restric-
tions, these, along with the letter of investment intent and the legend,
should be negotiated early in the process of the placement and should be
included verbatim in attendant agreements. It is suggested, moreover, that
the letter of intent recite the offeree's knowledge of the restrictions of Rule
144. Finally, it is suggested that careful client education by the attorney
will help to convince both issuer and offeree of the necessity for the restric-
tions. Perhaps these restrictions will appear less formidable if the agree-
ment and legend change the opining attorney to one suitable to the of-
feree after a holding period of two years, for example.
In any event, it does appear that the protection to be afforded the pri-
vate placement issuer by Article 8 is not so solidified as may have been
assumed.
L. Al. McCorkle
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